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FROM REALISM TO CRITICAL LEGAL

STUDIES: A TRUNCATED
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Ninth Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture*

by
G. Edward White**

INTRODUCTION:

REASSESSING INFLUENCE

N the 1930s a school of literary criticism surfaced that emphasized the
influence certain writers had on later writers. Shakespeare, it was
claimed, influenced Melville; Hawthorne influenced the early writings of
Henry James, and so on. The image furthered by this critical attitude was
that of a writer reading passages from previous writers and incorporating
their language, their tone, their sentence structure, or their metaphors into
his or her own writing. Living writers to whom the theory was applied resolutely denied being so influenced, but their denials were not taken seriously,
either because of the maxim that no writer likes to admit not being wholly
original and unique or because the influence could be recharacterized as
unconscious. I
Influence is now perceived to be a more complex and subtle phenomenon
than the 1930s scholars assumed. In particular, influence is perceived as
revealing more about the persons being influenced than those doing the influencing. The world of ideas has come to be seen as in some respects a remarkably closed world, bound in by time, place, politics, economics,
institutional structures, and above all the tacit presuppositions of mainstream thought in a given era. Extant ideas are received and filtered through
a series of ideological structures that refashion their content and especially
their implications. 2 From this perspective, Shakespeare does not so much
influence Melville as Melville influences Shakespeare: that is, Melville, and
others sharing his starting assumptions about the nature of existence and
social organization, tacitly emphasize certain features of Shakespeare and
* The Lecture based on this text was delivered at Southern Methodist University School
of Law on March 13, 1986.
** B.A., Amherst College; M.A., Ph.D., Yale University; J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law and History, University of Virginia.
1. See LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES xvii-xxiv (R. Spiller ed. 3d ed.
1963).
2. The seminal work here is T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970).
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deemphasize others. An image of Shakespeare is created for Melville and
like readers; it is this image that may be said to be influential. The process of
influence, from this perspective, can be most clearly observed in writers that
are not read by some subsequent generations and then "discovered" by
others. What has changed, of course, is not the content or style of the origiand tastes of the successive readers; what has
nal writer but the values
3
changed is the image.
With this in mind, it is interesting to find, in a recent symposium on the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, explicit statements that CLS has
been influenced by the Realist movement of the 1930s. Both supporters and
critics of CLS have posited a linkage between the two movements. David
Trubek describes the Critical Legal Studies movement as "an outgrowth of
American Legal Realism"; 4 Mark Tushnet calls CLS "the direct descendant
of Realism." 5 Philip Johnson states that one of the parents of CLS is "the
American Legal Realism of 50 years ago"; 6 Louis Schwartz claims that "the
'Realist' school of jurisprudence that flourished in the 1930s must be
counted as an important earlier model for CLS." '7 While the obvious implication of the linkage is that the Realists have somehow influenced Critical
Legal Studies scholars, the question raised in this Article is who has really
influenced whom. In an essay in the same symposium 8 I suggested that the
"self-conscious identification of Realism as a progenitor of, or an inspiration
for, the CLS movement" seemed to be "a grasp at legitimacy" and was "a
common enough lawyer's trick." 9 Those phrases sounded all right when I
wrote them, but flippancy tends to cut off intellectual inquiry, and I want to
take a further look at the relationship of Realism to Critical Legal Studies.
The exploration of that relationship has produced a complex intellectual
history that will have to be severely truncated and oversimplified here.
While I shall spend a little time sketching out that history, my primary purpose is not to add to the lore of those who regard themselves as "afficionados
of the thirties and forties." 10 My main concern is rather to ask why, if Realism is widely perceived as something that "ran itself into the sand" as "a
coherent intellectual force in American legal thought,"'" the Critical Legal
Studies movement, which seeks intellectual prominence, if certainly not respectability, would claim Realism as an influence; why Realism has come to
3. Cf White, The Rise and Fallof JusticeHolmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (197 1) (chronicling various images of Justice Holmes).
4. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV.
575, 577 (1984).
5. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruction,
36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1984).
6. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 252 (1984).
7. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413,
415 (1984).
8. White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1984).
9. Id. at 650.
10. Schlegel, Notes Towards an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 405 (1984).
11. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459, 459 (1979).
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be perceived as an intellectual dead end; and whether the same fate may
await Critical Legal Studies. The exploration of those questions is necessarily historical, but history here is in the service of contemporary philosophy
and politics.
There is a missing link in the evolution from Realism to Critical Legal
Studies. The link is not so much missing in the sense of unrecognized, but
rather in the sense of ignored or unexplained. That link is the Law and
Society movement, which began in the 1960s and still exists. The link turns
out to be, in my view, important for understanding the relationship of Realism to Critical Legal Studies and important to any prognostication of the
future of CLS. An explanation of the importance of the Law and Society
movement to the history sketched here requires some laying of groundwork.
I.

THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF REALISM

I have previously argued that the emergence of Realism in the 1920s and
thirties can be traced to the simultaneous convergence of two phenomena:
the acceptance of social science theory as legitimate academic discourse and
the apparent collapse of a late nineteenth-century individualist ethos in the
face of the ostensibly interdependent nature of twentieth-century American
society. 12 Legal scholars who came to call themselves Realists began with
the perception that many early twentieth-century judicial decisions were
"wrong." They were wrong as matters of policy in that they promoted antiquated concepts and values and ignored changed social conditions. They
were wrong as exercises in logic in that they began with unexamined premises and reasoned syllogistically and artificially to conclusions. They were
wrong as efforts in governance in that they refused to include relevant information, such as data about the effects of legal rules on those subject to them,
and insisted upon a conception of law as an autonomous entity isolated from
nonlegal phenomena. Finally, they were wrong in that they perpetuated a
status quo that had fostered rank inequalities of wealth, status, and condition and was out of touch with the modem world.
This perception may have been the source of Realism, but it was not what
made Realism distinctive. 13 The distinctive feature of Realism came in the
methodologies its adherents employed to demonstrate the validity of their
perception. The Realists employed two quite separate methodological approaches; the distinctiveness of the movement springs from the perception of
its adherents that the approaches were complementary rather than contradictory. One approach, termed "debunking" by those employing it and revived as "deconstruction" by Critical Legal Studies scholars, subjected
"wrong" opinions to a logical analysis that exposed their inconsistencies,
their unsubstantiated premises, and their tendency to pass off contingent
12. White, From Sociological Jurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change
in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1013-27 (1972).
13. The same perception characterized the writings of Roscoe Pound, Joseph Bingham,
Arthur Corbin, and other early twentieth-century advocates of sociological jurisprudence. See
id. at 1000-12.
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judgments as inexorable. The analytical basis for debunking, for most Realists, was Wesley Hohfeld's series of articles in the years prior to the First
World War, 14 in which he demonstrated the capacity of legal propositions to
be "flipped": that is, the sense in which every legal doctrine can be seen as a
suppressed version of an alternative doctrine. 15 Karl Llewellyn once summarized debunking as the process of demonstrating that "in any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available authoritative premises
...are at least two, and ...the two are mutually contradictory as applied to
the case in hand."16
Much of Realist scholarship was thus devoted to exposing the incoherence
of established patterns of reasoning in judicial decisions. By undermining
the inexorability of such logic, the Realists hoped to reveal the "real" question in judicial decisions: why "the court select[ed] ... one available premise
rather than the other."1 7 This was the point in Realist analysis where social
science entered. The answer to the question of premise selection was, in
most cases, that a given premise rested on unexamined value judgments that
were simply assumed by the court to be controlling. In cases raising the
question whether state hours and wages legislation violated a liberty to contract embodied in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, two authoritative premises were present. One premise was that employers and
employees had rights to define the terms of employment, and that statutory
prescriptions of those terms unduly curtailed those rights. The alternative
premise was that the balance of power between employers and employees in
the industrial marketplace was sufficiently unequal that no such rights in
employees could be said to exist: the contracts were simply coercive. Nothing in the nature of contract or liberty compelled the choice of one or the
other premise: the premises were social judgments about the desirability or
undesirability of protecting workers who had little bargaining power.
The "real" question in liberty of contract cases was, therefore, not "is
there a liberty to contract in the due process clause?" but "do industrial
14. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913) was the best known of Hohfeld's works. For a collection of Hohfeld's
published and unpublished materials, including A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law,
Hohfeld's 1914 model of a "scientific" law school, see W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS (W. Cook ed. 1923).
15. See Schlegel, supra note 10, at 405 (analyzing Hohfeld). A frequently cited example of
Realist scholarship employing the "Hohfeldian flip" is the work of Robert Hale. In three
articles in the 1920s Hale argued that certain legal rights taken by established orthodoxy to be
natural or absolute, such as freedom of contract or private property, could be seen as the

products of a public policy that tacitly allowed some free bargainers to be coerced and some
propertied persons to prevail over other nonpropertied persons. Legal rights in some, Hale
concluded, produced the absence of rights in others; the tacit policy choice to prefer entrenched rights could not be seen as a simple deference to the natural order of things. Hale,
Value and Vested Rights, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523 (1927); Hale, Coercion and Distribution
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923); Hale, Rate Making and
the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 212-14 (1922). A trenchant
discussion of Hale appears in Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1151, 1232-39 (1985).
16. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222, 1239 (1931).
17. Id.

1986]

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

workers in fact have no bargaining power to choose the terms of their employment?" 18 This question was, the Realists believed, susceptible of empirical analysis. One could, as Robert Hutchins said in 1927, ascertain "how
the rules of law are working" through "practicable investigation" into their
operation. 19 In sum, the Realists assumed that techniques existed for determining and analyzing human behavior, that meaningful generalizations
could be derived from those techniques, and that the generalizations could
then be reflected in policy proposals. Once one found "how the judicial
system actually works [and] how it is affecting the community," Hutchins
argued, one could learn how that system "may be altered to attain more
readily the objects for which it has been developed."' 20 Much later, Karl
Llewellyn generalized this perceived connection between empirical investigation and law reform: "Every fact-pattern of common life.., carries within
itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law.... The highest task of
law'2 1
giving consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law."
Recognizing that the Realist impulse was basically political in that it
originated with a judgment that many early twentieth-century judicial decisions represented examples of bad social policy helps to explain the simultaneous attachment of Realists to debunking and empirical research. Critiques
of the logic of opinions would reveal the outmoded character of their premises; empirical research would demonstrate why the premises were outmoded. But while the fusion of debunking and social science is explicable in one
sense, 22 it remains puzzling in another. Why didn't the Realists apply the
logic of their criticism to social science research itself? Why did they assume
that while arguments based on legal doctrines were necessarily value laden,
arguments based on empirical observation could be value free? Why did
Llewellyn, to take an example, define his concern to be with "law as a social
science, a science of observation," and then assert that "one's fighting convictions [should] never [be] allowed to interfere with accurate
23
observation?"
To criticize the Realists for not emphasizing that "scientific" inquiry has
its own ideological presuppositions is, in a sense, to impose the received wisdom of one generation on another. The social sciences, in the early twenti18. Cf supra note 15.
19. Hutchins, Report of Acting Dean, 1926-27, Yale Law School Archives 118-19, quoted
in Schlegel, supra note 11, at 493, 496.
20. Hutchins, Report of Dean, 1927-28, Yale Law School Archives 118, quoted in Schlegel, supra note 11, at 493.
21. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960) (quoting L. Goldschmidt, preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Kirit. Zeitschr. f.d. ges.
Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 4, No. 4).
22. The fusion is explicable, that is, if one assumes that social science research was an
apolitical, neutral activity. Treating social science as apolitical may have had its own political
ramifications: reformist academics in the 1920s may have wanted to avoid too close an identification with collectivist left movements such as Bolshevism. See generally D. FELIX, PROTEST: SACCO-VANZETTI AND THE INTELLECTUALS

(1965).

23. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method, in ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89, 90 (1931) (emphasis in original); see Llewellyn, On the Good, the
True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 250-64 (1942).
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eth century, were widely perceived of as antidotes to the soft epistomology of
traditional disciplines: they were exploring facts and revealing the world as it
really was. It is too much to say that no one recognized that social science,
or even "pure" science, was susceptible to being organized ideologically. As
traditionalist a legal scholar as Roscoe Pound argued, in 1931, that "preconceptions will creep in and will determine the choice of pure fact of fact as
they determined the pure fact of law . . .,24 Nevertheless the freshness of
empirical social science, for Realists, principally came from its assumed freedom from the conceptualist web of value laden doctrine.
Thus the common explanations for why Realism ran into the sand as an
influential intellectual movement do not take an additional, and perhaps obvious, explanatory step. Realism is typically said to have declined in influence because its debunking ultimately led to moral relativism and nihilism,
and suddenly, in the shadow of the Second World War, no one wanted to
endorse either of those positions; or because the empirical research called for
by the Realists was either not done or resulted in trivial findings. Neither
explanation is inaccurate, but the two can be combined. If one recalls that
Realism started with a political perception, and that its energies were thus
ultimately directed at the formation of "good" or "right" policy, the combination of deconstructionist logic and empirical research may have had a devastating effect. With the revelation that all legal doctrine was based on value
premises, "objective" methodologies became necessary. But the end purpose
of those methodologies was to conform doctrine to "real" life, that is, to
produce "better" legal decisions. Facts (the observation that something really existed) were thus inseparable from values (the judgment that doctrines
should facilitate what did exist). Discovering what was there was also discovering what was good.
It may be that those Realist legal scholars who set out to do empirical
research with the idea that "better" policies would emerge from it confronted, somewhere along the way, the realization that they had skewed
their observations at the outset. It may be, in other words, that such Realists
sensed a fundamental contradiction between debunking and empirical social
science: what I will term the fact-value dichotomy. 2 5 This might explain the
remarkable collective inability of Realist empiricists to complete their research projects and the tendency of legal scholars initially enthused with
social science to abandon it for other work or for silence. Of the Realist
enthusiasts for empirical research that clustered at Yale and Columbia law
schools in the 1920s and thirties, only one, Underhill Moore, was still identified with social science by 1940, and Moore's work was widely regarded as
24. Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1931).

25. The "fact-value dichotomy" is a shorthand phrase for conveying the simultaneous
need, in early and mid-twentieth-century reformist American elite thought, to separate value
judgments from empirical observation, lest the observation be biased, and to base value judgments on empirical observation, since objective fact-finding revealed the "realities" of American culture.
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ludicrous. 26 William 0. Douglas, Walton Hamilton, Walter Dodd, Charles
Clark, Wesley Sturges, and Llewellyn had each abandoned social science
research, abandoned scholarship altogether, or abandoned law teaching.
Their abandonment cannot be attributed to the demise of social science research generally, for it continued to flourish in other departments of universities. Social science research did not assume, however, an explicit policy
orientation in the fields of economics, statistics, sociology, anthropology, and
psychology. Scholars in those fields were perceived as neutral, objective experts. Law professors had never been so perceived and apparently could not
think of themselves in such terms.
II.

POSTWAR CLOSURE: THE FIRST POST-REALIST MOVEMENTS

The uneasy interaction of deconstructionist logic and objective social science can also be seen as background to the growth of two movements in the
1940s whose emergence severely pinched, and ultimately co-opted, the vital-

ity of Realism. One was the Law, Science, and Policy movement, ushered
into existence by Harold Lasswell's and Myres McDougal's 1942 article,
Legal Education and Public Policy.27 Laswell and McDougal identified law
as a social science, called for "scientific thinking," which meant a "familiar[ity] with the procedures by which facts are established by planned observation," and even advocated "realism," which they defined as "access to a
body of fact" through a process that "protect[s] the integrity of thought by
excluding or nullifying the non-relevant. ' 28 Most of the scholarly efforts
that formed the inspiration for their article were by Realists, 29 but Lasswell
and McDougal made clear that they were not going to become bogged down
in distinctions between "is" and "ought," facts and values. They urged that

legal education be reoriented so that empirical research was placed in the
service of democratic values:
What is needed now is to .. .[reorient] .. .every phase of law school
curricula and skill training toward the achievement of clearly defined
democratic values ....
...The student needs to clarify his moral values ... ; he needs to
orient himself in past trends and future probabilities; finally, he needs to
acquire the scientific knowledge and skills necessary to implement

objectives ....30
Lasswell and McDougal were equally clear about the reason for their reorientation of the relationship between value orientation and empirical
research:
26. On Moore see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: The
Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1980).
27. Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and PublicPolicy: Professional Trainingin
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1942).
28. Id. at 204, 212, 214, 229, 231.
29. Lasswell and McDougal cited works by Hohfeld, Clark, Douglas, Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant, and Llewellyn as inspiration for their article. See id. at 203-04 nn. 1 & 2.
30. Id. at 207, 212.
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It should need no re-emphasis here that... democratic values have
been on the wane in recent years. The dominant trends of world politics have been away from the symbols and practices of a free society and
toward the slogans, doctrines and structures of despotism....
...
[A] legitimate aim of education is to seek to promote the major
values of a democratic society and to reduce the number of moral mav31
ericks who do not share democratic preferences.
32
A "clarification of values" was thus the first step in Lasswell's and McDougal's program for training policymakers. One clarified and identified
one's value preferences before doing any empirical research; one then sought
to implement values through what Lasswell and McDougal called "trendthinking" and "scientific thinking." 33 Those terms turned out to be fancy
ways of suggesting that before one implemented one's values one should try
to identify "the shape of things to come regardless of preference" and to
"guide ...judgment by what is scientifically known and knowable about the
'3 4
causal variables that condition the democratic variables.
Lasswell's and McDougal's move evaded two difficulties in which the
Realists had found themselves. First, no one could accuse Law, Science, and
Policy advocates of being moral relativists or soft on totalitarianism. Lasswell, who was identified in the article as the Director of War Communications Research for the Library of Congress, and McDougal, who informed
his public that he had taken leave from the Yale faculty "to become General
Counsel of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in the
State Department, ' 35 identified their proposals as part of the war effort.
"The war period," they announced, "is a propitious moment to retool our
system of legal education ....
War is the time to retool our educational
3 6
processes in the hope of making them fit instruments for their future job."1
It was "self-congratulatory falsehood to [claim] that recent catastrophes
have come upon us like bolts from the blue"; 37 the program of Law, Science,
38
and Policy would be ready for the next totalitarian cycle.
Second, Lasswell and McDougal refused to linger over the dialectics of
the fact-value dichotomy. They did not consider the possibility that the dogmatism of antiquated rules might also be reflected in newer rules derived
from contemporaneous empirical observation. The question of whether facts
overwhelmed values or values overwhelmed facts they resolved summarily.
Their advice to law students at the value "clarification stage" is instructive:
Clarification of values ...must for effective training be distinguished
from the traditional, logical, derivation of values by philosophers. Such
derivation ...is a notorious blind alley. Divorced from operational

31. Id.
32. Id. at 212.

33. Id. at 213, 214.
34. Id..

35. Id. at 203.
36. Id. at 211.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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rules, it quickly becomes a futile quest for a meaningless why, perpetually culminating in "some inevitably circular and infinitely regressive
logical justification" for ambiguous preferences. From any relatively
specific statements of social goal ...can be elaborated an infinite series
of normative propositions of ever increasing generality; conversely, normative statements of high-level abstraction can be manipulated to support any specific social goal. Prospective lawyers should be exposed, by
way of warning.... to the work of representative specialists in derivation; relatively little time should be required, however, to teach them
39
how to handle, and how to achieve emotional freedom from, [it].
The solution to the fact-value dichotomy, then, was to ignore it: one dismissed infinite logical regressions and took a stand. Having taken a stand,
one implemented one's values by empirical research that confirmed them.
Law, Science, and Policy, despite the prolificity and mutual supportiveness of its adherents, has never gained widespread support in legal academic
culture, 4° partly, as one observer has noted, because "it seems to be wearisome, or too pretentious, or unpalatable, ' 4 1 and partly because its adherents'
repeated cataloguing of "values" and "goals" relevant to policymaking have
appeared to some observers as assertions or laundry lists. Nevertheless the
arrival of the movement, with all its fanfare, was a clear signal that the Realists' belief in the coexistence of value premise deconstruction and objective
empirical research had backed them into a corner.
The other movement pinching Realism in the 1940s was more subtle,
more effective, and gained a far wider acceptability. This movement was
Process Jurisprudence, which began with Lon Fuller's critique of Realism in
the 1930s and forties, 42 expanded to become a fullblown political science
theory in the 1930s, prescribing carefully defined roles for courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies,4 3 survived attacks by substantive rights
theorists in the 1960s, and is still very much a part of mainstream academic
thought, notwithstanding the problematic nature of its normative assumptions. I will not attempt a detailed sketch of Process Jurisprudence here,
having done that in other places" and not wanting to sidetrack the progres39. Id. at 213 (emphasis in original).
40. Bruce Ackerman, in his recent work RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984),
called Lasswell and McDougal "brave scholars," and their efforts "heroic," but noted that
"the [Law, Science, and Policy] school utterly failed to establish itself as a conversational
presence in ongoing professional interchange." Id. at 40, 41. Although Ackerman's comments seem largely accurate, the influence of Law, Science, and Policy on public international
law has been considerable. For one reaction from a public international law scholar see
Moore, Prologomenon to the Jurisprudenceof Myres McDougal and HaroldLasswell, 54 VA. L.
REV. 662, 663-64 (1968). Moore's point of view has been recently reinforced in Tipson, The
Lasswell-McDougalPublic Enterprise, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535, 535-37 (1974). Nonetheless, it
seems fair to say that the Law, Science, and Policy movement's initial goal, to replace Realism
as the dominant domestic jurisprudence of American law schools, has not come to fruition.
41. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 386 (1973).
42. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case
Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 381-95 (1946).
43. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958).
44. See G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 230-96 (1978); White, The
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REV. 279, 279-94 (1973).
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sion of this history unduly. I merely want to point out the basic strategy of
confession and avoidance that Process Jurisprudence theorists adopted toward Realism.
Despite the Realists' difficulties, they had made two contributions to
American jurisprudence that by the 1940s had come to be regarded as settled propositions. The first was that judges, in declaring legal rules, made
law in the sense that the rules were not logically necessary and reflected
policy judgments; the second was that law could not be a static entity, and
that its progressive development rested on its rules being responsive to current social conditions. By the 1940s it was no longer possible for judges to
ground decisions on appeals to law as a disembodied entity or as a bundle of
settled precedents. Universal or static conceptions of law were thus no
longer perceived as genuine constraints on judges.
Advocates of Process Jurisprudence took the above propositions as a
given and sought to fashion new sets of constraints on judicial lawmaking.
One set focused on the nature of judicial reasoning: process theorists insisted that judges engaged in "reasoned elaboration" of the results they
reached by invoking legal principles of sufficient neutrality and generality to
"transcend" immediate results. In constitutional adjudication judges should
invoke and articulate "neutral principles"; in statutory interpretation they
should identify and follow the purposes of the relevant statutes; in common
law decisionmaking they should articulate the principles and policies embodied in common law rules. These exercises would insure that judicial decisionmaking would be subject to intellectual constraints. Failure to engage in
appropriately "principled" adjudication would result in opinions being subject to academic criticism and a consequent loss of stature. 45
The other set of constraints was institutional. Process theorists developed
a model of political science in which the leading lawmaking institutions in
American society were assigned functional roles. Administrative agencies
"found facts" and developed "expertise" in specific areas of the economy;
legislatures made policy by weighing the competing demands of interests and
reaching compromise solutions through the process of democratic politics;
courts identified and articulated legal principles, some of which justified judicial lawmaking, others of which envisaged judicial deference to more expert
or more democratic lawmaking bodies. So defined, the legal process insured
responsiveness to changing social conditions through the democracy of legislatures and the expertise of agencies and erected safeguards against irresponsible or insular judicial rulemaking. The process could even be said to have
an "inner morality," since the requirements of reasoned elaboration and institutional competence insured that lawmaking would be fair, democratic,
and accountable. 46 The model thus solved, for its adherents, the problems of
45. For contemporary examples see Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.

REV. 84, 98-99 (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73

HARV.

L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1959).
46. The most representative statement of the institutional competence theory is H. HART
& A. SACKS, supra note 43. For a claim that properly functioning processes had an "inner
morality" see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (1963).
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judicial unresponsiveness and unchecked judicial power, and had the added
attraction of being faithful to democratic values.
Law, Science, and Policy and Process Jurisprudence were jurisprudential
movements predicated on the existence of a deep consensus among Americans about values and institutional roles. They were in that sense products
of a period in American history in which the "end of ideology" 47 was announced, conformity and solidarity were regarded as virtues, and social ferment was assumed to have receded. No sooner was this assumed consensus
in place than the civil rights movement began to erode it. That movement
suggested that a group of Americans had been existing well outside the
majoritarian democratic mainstream; that the rights of those Americans to
be treated fairly and equally overrode institutional considerations such as
deference to legislative policy; that renewed attention to the civil rights of
minorities had not come through democratic processes, but through the recognition of the substantive validity of minority claims; that judicial deference
to administrative expertise or to legislative representativeness would have
retarded the recognition of minority rights; and that neutral principles of
constitutional adjudication were not much help in protecting minorities
against discrimination. The interaction of Process Jurisprudence with the
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the emergence of the Warren Court
as a visible defender of minority rights, sparked an intellectual debate about
the meaning and efficacy of reasoned elaboration and principled
48
adjudication.
My interest here is not with that debate, however, but with another, lesser
known development in the 1960s. Recall the two principal features of Realism: deconstruction of judicial opinions and calls for empirical research.
Process Jurisprudence and the Law, Science, and Policy movement had
sought to fuse those efforts in a reconstructed theory of law and legal institutions. Under the Law, Science, and Policy version of that theory, deconstruction would begin with open statements of value orientation, and
empirical research would be enlisted in the reformulation of doctrine that
followed from such statements. Under the Process Jurisprudence version,
deconstruction became subsumed in the ideals of reasoned elaboration and
principled adjudication, in which normative assumptions were grounded in
appeals to principles or policies extrinsic to the court invoking the appeal;
empirical research became subsumed in the theory of institutional competence and the idea of deference to administrative rules or policies based on
expertise.
The result was to produce two closed jurisprudential systems: one system
in which the proper functioning of legal institutions guaranteed progressive
and democratic results and another system in which that functioning guaranteed responsive and enlightened policies. The attacks on neutral principles theory generated by the civil rights movement were a protest against the
first closed system. A protest against the second closed system was less visi47. Cf D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960).
48. For the details see White, supra note 44, at 294-98.
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ble and influential in legal academic life in the 1960s, but it emerged with the
Law and Society movement. The governing assumption of the Law and Society movement can be said to have been that Law, Science, and Policy or
Process Jurisprudence had obfuscated a central inquiry of the Realists:
whether the "law on the books" was the equivalent of the "law in action."
Was the implementation of democratic values prescribed by Law, Science,
and Policy actually taking place? Were the expert judgments of agencies
truly based on the detached empirical observation of social conditions? Was
there a gap between the claims of lawmakers that they were responsive to
social needs and their actual responses to those needs?
III.

THE MISSING LINK: FROM LAW AND SOCIETY TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES

The formation of the Law and Society Association in 1964 and the appearance two years later of the Law and Society Review marked the official
emergence of the Law and Society movement. The movement was initially
originated by sociologists as well as law professors, and its first endeavors
reflected that fact. The aims of the movement were described exclusively in
neutral, academic terms: no political dimension was suggested. The first
president of the Law and Society Association called for "more rigorous and
49
formal interdisciplinary training" in law and sociology, and the initial edition of the Law and Society Review described its appearance as a response to
''a growing need on the part of social scientists and lawyers for a forum in
which to carry on an interdisciplinary dialogue." 50 The Review sought, its
editor suggested, to create "a professional cadre who are able to move freely
from their original disciplinary base into the related fields." 51
This tone was typical of academic discourse throughout the 1950s and
most of the 1960s: rarely were intellectual movements described in ideological terms. The orientation of the movement becomes clear, however, on a
further perusal of the first volume of the Law and Society Review. In the
second issue Richard Schwartz, the editor, in referring to a recently published book by sociologist Jerome Skolnick, described the work as "enlighten[ing] us on the process by which law on the books is transformed (or
distorted) into law in action."'52 The key word in that sentence was "distorted." Schwartz went on to describe examples of unanticipated consequences of legal policies, such as "drug addiction increasing because of
efforts at enforcement, public defender systems enhancing conviction rates,
[and] Draconian divorce codes generating perjury."5' 3 Schwartz's point was
that empirical research often revealed the dysfunctional effects of legal rules
and policies or the hidden purposes of a rule or policy that had been justified
49. Yegge, The Law and Society Association to Date, L. & Soc'Y REV., Nov. 1966, at 3, 4.
50. Schwartz, From the Editor.... L. & Soc'y REV., Nov. 1966, at 6.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Schwartz, Personnel and Progress in Sociological Research, L. & Soc'y REV., June
1967, at 4.
53. Id. at 6.
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on different grounds. The first article to appear in the Law and Society Review had, in fact, taken Schwartz's logic one step further. In a report in
"Civil Justice and the Poor"5 4 three sociologists based at Berkeley had argued that "the law is not a neutral instrument, but rather that it is oriented
in favor of those groups or classes in society having the power to bend the
legal order to their advantage." 5 "[T]oday as in the past," the authors
maintained, "the law primarily serves to protect and enhance the rights and
interests of property holders and those in positions of wealth and
'56
authority."
If one views the emergence of the Law and Society movement in the context of both Realism and the efforts to co-opt Realist insights in the 1940s
and fifties, the movement's initial emphasis appears as an effort to return to a
"purer" strand of Realist research. The Realists had, of course, sounded a
call for studies of the transformation of law on the books to law in action,
and they had suggested that such studies would reveal a gap between "paper
rules" and the realities of implementative practice. Both the Law, Science,
and Policy movement and Process Jurisprudence had, however, suggested
that if such a gap existed, it could be corrected either by an adjustment of
value orientation (such as "caring more" about the rights of the poor) or by
an adjustment of the processes through which law was made (to make those
processes more consistent with the purposes of the rules themselves). The
Law and Society movement's return to "pure" Realism suggested that these
adjustments were naive or unworkable. Its suggestion that law was not neutral but rather facilitative of the interests of the wealthy and powerful flew
directly in the face of claims that the reconstituted postwar legal order of
processes and policies was democratic, egalitarian, and dispassionate.
The Law and Society movement, aided by foundation support, 57 made
significant inroads in some academic institutions in the 1960s and seventies.
Notable were Berkeley, where a Center for the Study of Law and Society
was established; Wisconsin, which began a program in sociology and law
and funded a Law and Society section in the Wisconsin Law Review; Northwestern, which had instituted a joint Ph.D.-J.D. program in law and the
social sciences in 1964; and Denver, which in the same year began a program
in the administration of justice. All of these programs benefited from the
perceived crisis brought about by the apparently dramatic rise in criminal
behavior and violence in the early 1960s. The programs may be said to represent the first concentration of interdisciplinary research at American law
schools since the 1930s. Social scientists had joined the Columbia and Yale
faculties at that time, but in the years after the Second World War interdisciplinary work had almost disappeared, notwithstanding the Law, Science,
54. Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, L. & Soc'v REV., Nov. 1966, at 9.
55. Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id.
57. The Russell Sage Foundation and the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law
supported early Law and Society research projects. See Yegge, President's Report, L. & Soc'Y
REV.,

June 1967, at 7.
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and Policy movement's program. With the infusion of sociologists and psychologists into law faculties in the 1960s, however, a new pattern of interdisciplinary emphasis was established that has not yet abated.
Of the various institutional centers of the Law and Society movement,
Wisconsin, for a variety of reasons, has turned out to be the most influential.
Wisconsin had to its advantage a long state tradition of assumed compatibility between empirical research and progressive policymaking, stretching
back to the early days of the twentieth century. It also, partly because of
that tradition, had closer interdisciplinary cooperation than many other universities, and by the late 1960s had assembled a cluster of persons such as
Stewart Macaulay, Jack Ladinsky, Lawrence Friedman, and Robert Rabin,
to name only some, who had an abiding interest in the relationship of law to
other disciplines. By the end of the 1960s this group of persons had begun to
produce a body of scholarship whose emphasis could fairly be described as
that reflected in the initial volume of the Law and Society Review. Friedman
and Macaulay, in particular, had universalized the theory that legal rules
reflected the needs and interests of powerful elites. 58 As Friedman put it in
4 History of American Law, which appeared in 1973:
This is a social history of American law. I have tried to fight free of
jargon, legal and sociological; but I have surrendered myself wholeheartedly to some of the central insights of social science....
...The laws of China, the United States, Nazi Germany, France,
and the Union of South Africa reflect the goals and policies of those
who call the tune in those societies. Often, when we call law "archaic,"
we mean that the power system of its society is morally out of tune. But
change the power system, and the law too will change. The basic premise of this book is that ...the strongest ingredient in American law, at
any given time, is the present: current emotions, real economic interests, concrete political groups.5 9
In the preface to his History Freidman acknowledged the contributions of
Wisconsin, where, he said, "[t]here was an atmosphere of ferment that centered about studies in legal history and in law and the social sciences." 6 But
Wisconsin is as important, in this history, for what happened there shortly
after the publication of Friedman's book, at the very moment, one might
have thought, when the core ideas of the Law and Society movement were
about to expand beyond a relatively narrow base of empirically minded law
professors and social scientists to the legal academic profession at large.
Friedman's book was in a sense an effort in that vein; it presented history as
the continuous playing out of a thesis about law and power. In 1977, however, as Friedman's work was settling into the general consciousness of law,
58. See, e.g., S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS

(1966); Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development,

L. & Soc'Y REV., Aug. 1969, at 29; Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change,

19 STAN. L. REV. 786 (1967); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
59. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 10, 14 (1973) (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 11.
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professors and historians, three events occurred, each of them associated
with Wisconsin, that signified an alteration in the intellectual atmosphere of
elite legal academic culture, an alteration that was to have negative effects on
the influence of the Law and Society movement.
The first two events took place in scholarly literature, and represented
efforts on the part of younger scholars who had been part of the Law and
Society circle to distinguish themselves from the movement. In a book review of Friedman's A History ofAmerican Law in the Wisconsin Law Review,
Mark Tushnet called Friedman's approach "the last great work of the
1950's. ' ' 61 Friedman's perspective, Tushnet claimed, ignored "the influence
of autonomy on the legal order" and "the ideological functions of the legal
order... [in] persuading both oppressor and oppressed that their conditions
or existence are just."' 62 Tushnet's point was that the Law and Society tradition from which Friedman's History had emerged had too reflexively treated
law as molded by society and had thus wrongly characterized gaps between
law on the books and law in action as indications of archaic or unresponsive
legal rules. Rules often functioned, Tushnet maintained, to legitimate a calculated unresponsiveness on the part of the legal order. "Material benefits,"
Tushnet asserted, "have never been equally distributed in American society,
and the law serves as a partial explanation, to those who receive less, of why
they do."'63 Friedman's History, in short, "ignore[d] the ideological functions of law." 64
Tushnet's review was accompanied by an article in the Law and Society
Review by David Trubek, another Wisconsin law professor, that called for a
"new realism" in the study of law in society. 6 5 The new realism, for Trubek,
consisted of a combination of empirical research and "critical social
thought."' 66 Trubek outlined an "agenda of critical social inquiry":
Our program must be concerned with an analysis of the tension between ideals and reality in the legal order, and of the relations between
law and society ....
It must be concerned with the gap between the
ideals of the law and its reality, between law in the books and law in
action, without falling into the belief either
that all such gaps are inevi67
table or that any is merely accidental.
Two features of Trubek's formulation deserve comment. The first is his effort to stress continuity between critical social thought, the Law and Society
movement, and Realism by wrapping his agenda in certain evocative
phrases. Critical social thought was a "new realism"; its focus was the traditional Realist and Law and Society inquiry into "the gap between ...law in
61. Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of
Friedman's "A History of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81, 82.

62. Id. at 83.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id.
65. Trubek, Complexity and Contradictionin the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge
of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REV. 529, 540-45 (1977).
66. Id. at 566.
67. Id. at 566-67.
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the books and law in action"; 68 it was a perspective in "the basic tradition of
the law and society movement"; 69 there was "nothing 'new' about the realism [he was] describ[ing]"; 70 critical social thought was what Realists and
Law and Society people "have been doing all along."' 71 Trubek's evocation
of continuity can be said to represent the first effort of Critical Legal Studies
to identify itself with the Realist movement.
The second striking feature of Trubek's proposal was its flipping of the
normative consequences of discovery of a gap between legal rules as articulated and as implemented. Friedman had suggested that while such a gap
had regularly existed, it was reparable in either of two ways: through a
closer analysis of what purposes the rules "really" served, in which case the
rules could be shown to be doing quite a good job of furthering the interests
of powerful elites; or through a kind of benign resignation, reflected in Friedman's comment that if the legal system was not working in one sector, another sector would emerge in which the gap between ideals and practice was
narrower. 72 Trubek suggested, to the contrary, that gaps were never reparable in those terms because the gaps were never accidental or inevitable, and
that merely documenting the existence of gaps in an "objective" manner was
not enough; 73 the scholar had to recognize "the necessity of normative inquiry" 74 and the responsibility for "transcending" legal structures whose
75
purpose was to perpetuate gaps.
The latter emphasis of Trubek's proposal signified an abandonment of the
Realist assumption, shared by the Law and Society movement, that empirical research could be conducted from an objective perspective. While
Trubek wished to retain the empirical emphasis of earlier movements, he
was quick to equate objective empiricism with "positivism" and to suggest
that to rest on a finding that gaps existed was to legitimate the gaps. 76 The
association of empirical research with positivism thus made two implicit suggestions, which later work in Critical Legal Studies was to make explicit.
The first suggestion was that empirical research legitimated the status quo by
implying that the "facts" of the research were somehow inevitably "there"
as part of the permanent "reality" of American culture. The second, related,
suggestion was that a scholar could not separate ideology from methodology
in empirical, or any, research: to be politically reformist and methodologically neutral was a contradiction in terms. In making the second suggestion
Trubek had resurrected the fact-value dichotomy again, this time communicating it in the evocative word "positivism."
68. Id. at 567.
69. Id. at 568.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. "The legal system always 'works'; it always functions.... If the courts, for example,
are hidebound and ineffective, that merely means some other agency has taken over what
courts might otherwise do." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 14.
73. Trubek, supra note 65, at 567.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
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Of all the issues that were to demarcate Critical Legal Studies from the
Law and Society movement, the association of objective empiricism with
positivism was the most explosive and the most clearly joined. As critical
theorists came to suggest that by ignoring ideology and autonomy and by
not conducting research from an openly normative and critical perspective,
reformist scholars were reinforcing the status quo, some members of the
Law and Society movement balked, refusing to accept such a characterization of their work. The eventual result was a fragmentation of the Law and
77
Society movement.
In 1977 another development also facilitated the fragmentation of Law
and Society. By that year elite law schools had tenured four persons whose
ideological stance was leftist but whose scholarship had not been empirically
oriented in the Law and Society tradition. The individuals were Morton
Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Roberto Unger, all on the Harvard faculty,
and Tushnet, who had gained tenure at Wisconsin. The scholarly emphasis
of the four had been historical and philosophical, and their methodology had
been qualitative and even doctrinal, though not in a traditional sense. While
Horwitz's Transformation of American Law7 8 identified powerful elites
whose interests, he argued, had been furthered by changing common law
rules, he neither made an empirical effort to particularize the members of
those elites nor suggested that their presence was inevitable or accidental.
Moreover, his methodology focused on the normative assumptions and content of doctrine, seeking thereby to identify a consciousness embodied in
legal rules. Kennedy's, Unger's, and Tushnet's work, although diverse, was
similarly interested in legal doctrine, legal consciousness, and the ideological
79
structures in which legal rules were embedded.
The tenuring of those individuals was itself an implicit recognition of the
worth of their scholarship by elite law schools, but it had other consequences
as well. The presence of Horwitz, Kennedy, Tushnet, and Unger as "accepted" law professors, when coupled with the existence of other tenured
academics who were politically left and sympathetic to the Law and Society
movement, stimulated an effort to create, as one CLS insider has termed it,
"an alliance" between "senior law and society teachers" and "a newly tenured group of Harvard people."8 0° The intermediaries facilitating this alli77. See infra note 84.
78. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 253-54

(1977).
79. See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Tushnet, The American
Law of Slavery, 1810-1860, 10 L. & Soc'Y REV. 119 (1975).
80. 2 Lizard 3 (1985). The Lizard is a mimeographed newsletter occasionally distributed
around the time of the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. Its contributors are anonymous. The Lizard's staff has described itself as "an emanation of a small
faction within the critical legal studies movement, sometimes referred to as the True Left." 1
Lizard 3 (1984). The editors of Lizard claim that it "does not conform to the general attitude
of the membership [of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies], which is far more responsible
and boring." Id. My claim that the remarks quoted in this sentence are those of an insider
should thus be taken in context, although Johnson, supra note 6, at 286 n.103, has identified
Duncan Kennedy as one of the Lizard's editors. The Lizard also has a tendency to delight in
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ance were Trubek and Tushnet of the Wisconsin faculty and Richard Abel,
who had been a law student at Yale with Kennedy and Tushnet in the late
sixties and early seventies. The initial vehicle for the alliance was a conference, held in Madison in May 1977, to which selected Law and Society and
critical scholars were invited. The organizing committee for that conference
included Trubek, Kennedy, Horwitz, Unger, Tushnet, Abel, two additional
Wisconsin faculty members, Macaulay and Tom Heller, and Rand Rosenblatt, a member of the faculty of Rutgers Law School at Camden. The list of
invitees included such Law and Society types as Marc Galanter, from Wisconsin, and Phillipe Nonet and Jerome Selznick, both from Berkeley. The
list also included a group of "ex-students of the Harvard profs," such as
Robert Gordon, Karl Klare, William Simon, Mark Kelman, and Peter Ga'81
bel, who "were either already in or about to enter law teaching.
As histories of the Critical Legal Studies movement have suggested, the
alliance between Law and Society scholars and the newer critical theorists
failed to come off. According to one version, "the senior law and society
types either didn't show up or left in dismay at the political radical rhetoric
of most participants"; 8 2 according to another, "the attack on social science
at the first meeting ... was so strong that it [engendered a] bitter, fifties-like

denunciation" and a resigned estrangement from two Law and Society
scholars. 83 The result has been that to the extent there are wings in the
current Critical Legal Studies movement, they are represented by other than
senior Law and Society scholars. Only Abel and Trubek currently retain a
foothold in both CLS and the Law and Society movement, and the latter
movement includes members committed
to "positivist" empirical research
84
and unsympathetic to critical theory.

the vivid overstatement; its characterizations of the meaning of events may reflect that
tendency.
81. 2 Lizard 3 (1985); Schlegel, supra note 10, at 394-96.
82. 2 Lizard 3 (1985).
83. Schlegel, supra note 10, at 408.
84. A recent issue of the Law and Society Review provides a starting point for analysis of
the current condition of the Law and Society movement. In his presidential address to the
Law and Society Association in June 1984, Marc Galanter sought to characterize "[t]he law
and society enterprise." Galanter, The Legal Malaise; or, Justice Observed, 19 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 537, 537 (1985). The synopsis of Galanter's remarks was as follows:
During the twenty years since the founding of the Law and Society Association, a distinctive "law and society" discourse has emerged and been institutionalized in a multidisciplinary scholarly community, which has been instrumental
in producing a tremendous increase in systematic knowledge about the law in
action. The growth of law and society research has accompanied other changes
in the distribution of information about the legal process, including a new legal
journalism and greater media coverage that make the law in action more visible
to a wider audience. Current distress of legal elites about the hypertrophy of
legal institutions is viewed as a reaction to the increased currency of information
that discredits the perceived picture of the legal world. The coincidence of
structural changes in law with changes in the social institutions of knowledge
about law creates the possibility of a more responsive and inquiring legal
process.
Id. The vocabulary employed in this synopsis is strikingly evocative. The Law and Society
movement is characterized as employing a "distinctive ... discourse." That discourse has
been "institutionalized" and spread to a "multidisciplinary scholarly community." The conse-
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IV.

THE EMERGENCE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

The separation of Critical Legal Studies from the Law and Society movement invites a further look at the intellectual origins of critical theory, for it
is clear, notwithstanding the linkage between Law and Society and Critical
Legal Studies, that other factors played a part in generating the attack on
"positivist" social science that fostered the split. Important among those
factors were the critical Marxist scholarship of continental academics 85 and
the New Left ideas8 6 that had gained currency in American academic circles
in the 1960s. The contributions of continentalist theorists have been catalogued as "the indeterminancy of social circumstances .... the impossibility
of deriving intelligible laws of historical change, economic or otherwise,"
and the significance of "alienation, ideology, historical contingency, and the
role of human agency in history." 87T In particular, the continentalists seem
to have convinced many critical theorists that systems of ideology and strucquence of the discourse's spreading is a "tremendous increase in systematic knowledge," and
the knowledge is about that familiar Realist topic, "the law in action." Law and Society research can be viewed as part of an information explosion that has had the effect of "mak[ing]

the law in action more visible."
The "[c]urrent distress of legal elites" about the dysfunctional character of legal institutions
can be traced to that information explosion. The information has served to "discredit ...the
received picture of the legal world." The consequence has been changes in both the structure
of law and "the social institutions of knowledge about law." The changes augur the promise of
a new and "inquiring legal process."
In this vision of the history of the twenty years of the Law and Society movement, Law-andSociety-style research is pictured as an important causative factor in fomenting distress about
law and legal institutions and in increasing the hope of a more responsive legal process. The
original goals of the movement remain intact and to some extent have been achieved. The
vehicle for this achievement, "systematic knowledge," has taken on an objective quality: it is a
currency of information, tangible and real like other currencies. This development is so even
though the knowledge emerged with the institutionalization of a discourse. A theoretical approach to research has thus evolved, in the vision, into something real: knowledge about how
the "law in action" "works." The paragraph thus appears to be an archetypal example of the
positivization of an academic theory. In this vein, it is no accident that eight pages later in the
article Galanter notes that Law and Society discourse "is a discourse with a rich and sometimes uneasy mix of positivist and interpretivist ingredients" exemplified, as "several readers
have pointed out," by his own essay. Id. at 543 & n. 17.
The invitation Galanter makes in his article, written for a group of peers, is to close ranks
around the positivistic vision of the Law and Society movement. Yet at the same time Galanter is well aware that the relationship between scholarly interpretation and positivism is
uneasy. I believe that uneasiness to be the central source of potential fragmentation in the
current Law and Society movement.
85. Examples would be Theodor Adorno, Jurgen Habermans, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, who were associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research from the
1950s through the 1970s, and, more recently, Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida, French
linguistic philosophers. On the Frankfurt school theorists see G. FRIEDMAN, THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (1981). On Derrida and Foucault see Heller,
Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1984); Peller, supra note 15.
86. The phrase "New Left ideas" is difficult to particularize much further. Here it refers
to the revived interest in the views of radical theorists such as Antonio Gramsci, George
Lukacs, and Jean-Paul Sartre, that took place in the 1960s, an interest that was reinforced by
the political examples of Fidel Castro's Cuba and Mao Tse-Tung's China. Two sources with
widely different perspectives on the New Left are A. GOULDNER, THE Two MARXISMS (1980)
and W. O'NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's
(1971).

87. Schlegel, supra note 10, at 393-94 n.9.
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tures of language and discourse, including law, play a significant role in
making contingent and indeterminate value judgments appear to be universal and fundamental propositions. They have directed attention to the tacit
presuppositions of ideological systems and structures, and suggested that
those presuppositions be "unpacked" to reveal their contingent nature.
The memory of 1960s New Left politics, for this same group of scholars,
appears to have been recast as historical evidence of a protest against the
attempted legitimation of a contingent set of assumptions. As the memory
goes, the leadership community that escalated and justified the Vietnam War
conceived that war in terms that reflected historically contingent assumptions: while the Vietnam leadership "knew" that the struggle in Southeast
Asia was between the free world and the Communist bloc, that division was
wholly their creation. The ideology of the war effort, however, functioned to
legitimate that conceptualization and to justify committing American
soldiers to fight against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The ideology also served to rationalize the deaths of those Americans killed in the
fighting as having died fighting for their country. To protest groups in the
1960s, many of whose members were directly affected by the war effort, the
leadership's assumptions seemed wrongheaded and their power to conscript
unwilling draftees seemed morally dubious.8 8 While New Left politics were
not limited to protests against the war effort, the apparently naked use of an
alien ideological system to determine whether young people lived or died
had a galvanizing effect. Both commentators on Critical Legal Studies and
members of the movement have noted that most of its principals "came to
maturity during the late sixties or early seventies," and "[m]ost began teaching during these years ...

often after a stint in legal services or some other

89
reform-oriented post, as well as participation in the antiwar movement."
One might push the 1960s antiwar experience one step further in explaining the excitement generated by continental critical theory for several members of CLS. The continental theorists suggested that the material
conditions in a society, while not unimportant factors in any causal explanations of human conduct, could not be separated from the total ideological
gestalt of a culture. Data, in their perspective, were inevitably filtered and
given significance by ideological structures. The recast memory of Vietnam
may well appear relevant to this insight. One of the dominant characteristics of the Vietnam war leadership was its continual skewing and even falsification of relevant data about the war: statistics were used to demonstrate
the validity of the leadership's assumptions and to convey a finite sense that
the war effort was succeeding when that conclusion required a rather perverse definition of success. The Vietnam War effort was, in short, an ideological exercise in which empirical data was regularly enlisted in the service
of the dominant ideology.

88. This is, of course, a bare-bones summary of a complicated process. For more detail
see White, supra note 8, at 668-70.
89. Schlegel, supra note 10, at 406; see also Parker, The Past of Constitutional TheoryAnd Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 257 (1981).
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CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE INFLUENCE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

Thus a combination of factors internal to and external to American academic life in the 1970s helped define an environment favorable to the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies movement: in that sense CLS is not
simply a reincarnation of Realism or the Law and Society movement. But if
CLS is unique, it is also part of a continuing intellectual history, the history
of twentieth-century American legal scholarship. Where does Critical Legal
Studies fit in that history? What place will the movement be occupying (or
have occupied) in the year 2000?
If we look at the ideological map of current legal scholarship, it is clear
that we have come very far from the consensus of the 1950s, when Law,
Science, and Policy and Process Jurisprudence closed ranks to produce
broad agreement on what "good" scholarship was and what ideological purposes it served. We now find on the map, reading from right to left, the Law
and Economics movement; reconstructed substantive rights theory, with its
emphasis on "principles" and, depending on one's political point of view,
libertarian or contractarian "rights"; 90 so-called mainstream scholarship, a
blend of an older analytical tradition, emphasizing doctrinal exegesis and the
assumptions of unreconstructed Law, Science, and Policy or Process Jurisprudence; the unreconstructed Law and Society movement, whose practitioners, with a handful of exceptions, now distinguish themselves from
Critical Legal Studies as well as from mainstream scholarship; 9 1 and Critical
Legal Studies. No one of these groups can be said to be dominant, but the
intellectual energy of elite law schools seems concentrated more in Law and
Economics and in Critical Legal Studies than in the other movements. It
seems fair to say, in fact, that mainstream scholarship and the Law and Society movement are currently on the defensive and that substantive rights theory is still in the gestation stage.
Critical Legal Studies thus can be said to be currently in a position of
visibility and perhaps even prominence, but at the same time to occupy an
extreme and perhaps a marginal position on the ideological spectrum. Here
the historical links to the Law and Society movement and to Realism are
suggestive. The Realists began as academic rebels whose claims were perceived by mainstream scholars as anywhere from infuriating to lunatic, but,
despite attacks by previous reformers such as Pound, the Realists penetrated
the consciousness of academics, so that by the 1940s only the relativist and
nihilist underpinnings of Realism had to be sloughed off, and those under the
perhaps unique pressure of a war against Nazis. Domesticated Realism, in
the form of process theory and Law, Science, and Policy, may have betrayed
90. Thus certain substantive rights theorists, such as Bruce Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980), Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), and
John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), would be contractarian, and others, such as Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), Richard Epstein, and David A.J. Richards would be libertarian. The distinction reflects an emphasis on the primacy of deep beliefs

in equality (the contractarians) or autonomy (the libertarians).
91. See supra note 84.
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the original Realist impulse, but it was hardly anything like the early twentieth-century conceptualism the Realists sought to dismantle.
Similarly, the Law and Society movement, initially a collection of voices
crying in a wilderness, has had its own form of domestication. Interdisciplinary research is now the norm at elite schools; "law and" continues to be the
rage. Not only do law faculties have their more than token social scientist
faculty members, "traditionalist" scholars regularly do work that involves
exploration into other disciplines. One of the ironies of the domestication of
the Law and Society movement, in fact, is the great success of a discipline
not originally included in the cluster of social sciences identified by the Law
and Society Association at its formation: economics. It is ironic that the
economists were left out originally; it is also ironic that their stock has dramatically risen as the Law and Society movement has been placed on the
defensive. The explanation of the ironies is easy enough: Law and Economics has been, from its modern renaissance in 1960, both ideological and
right-wing. 92 It has staked its prominence on welfare models of a free-market kind, and those models have become politically resonant. It has also not
gotten bogged down in the fact-value dialectic: when its practitioners encounter thorny complexities in the process of designing their models, they
label them externalities and put them aside. Contemporary normative Law
and Economics is an almost perfect mirror of Langdellian conceptualism:
when an outcome is inefficient, just as when a case did not fit a principle, it is
rejected as "wrong."
I have suggested elsewhere that domestication is a possible fate of Critical
Legal Studies. 93 But what is the feature of the movement most likely to be
absorbed into mainstream consciousness and thus domesticated? Here a recapitulation of the linear progression from Realism to Critical Legal Studies
is appropriate. The distinctive feature of Realism, I have argued, was the
Realists' disinclination to regard the simultaneous pursuit of debunking and
empirical social science research as a contradictory enterprise. Empirical
research, in their view, was somehow objective and thus immune from
deconstructionist analysis. The Law and Society movement, while not
deconstructionist, may be said to have held at its origins the deconstructionists' view that empirical inquiry was an objective enterprise: empirical data
contained their own inherent truth, which could then be used as a corrective
to subjectivist rules and policies.
This very issue-whether empirical research was somehow exempt from
the fact-value complexities that invade other areas of intellectual discourse-92. Of course Law and Economics, while it cannot avoid being ideological, could be left
wing or centrist as well, as has economic theory in past generations. Since 1960, however, the
Law and Economics movement in American law schools has been dominated by welfare economics and public choice theorists, both of which are opposed to governmental distributions of
economic benefits and burdens when the capitalist market offers an alternative distribution.
Given the commitment of centrist and leftist policies to governmental intervention in the mar-

ket since the 1930s, this stance among Law and Economics theorists can fairly be characterized as New Right or reactionary, depending on how one feels about it.
93. White, supra note 8, at 650-5 1. My phrase "absorption and conversion" in that article
is the equivalent of "domestication" here.
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prompted the split between unreconstructed Law and Society theorists and
advocates of Critical Legal Studies. The critique of empirical research as
"positivist" has been a technique by which critical theorists have suggested
that no immunity can exist: all research is necessarily value-laden and political, and to pretend that some is not is to advance claims of neutrality that
serve to reinforce the status quo.
At this point the linear relationship between Realism, the Law and Society
movement, and Critical Legal Studies becomes severed, and Critical Legal
Studies appears as the heir to only one phase of the Realist movement, its
deconstructionist phase. The insight of critical theorists that all research is
value laden, especially in the less overt sense of being shaped by tacit agreements about its "proper" agenda and direction, is both the single most radical feature of the Critical Legal Studies movement and, because of its radical
implications, the feature others will be most anxious to domesticate.
Nonempiricist Critical Legal Studies scholarship has up to this point
channeled its energy into two modes. One mode has been deconstruction:
the exposure of fundamental contradictions in mainstream doctrines and
policies. The other mode has been "transformative" political appeals, beginning with the claim that since the very premises on which mainstream rules
and policies have been erected are contingent and self-contradictory, "things
could be otherwise." I think that the first mode has made a genuine contribution to twentieth-century intellectual discourse; that it has been wrongly
characterized by both supporters and opponents as "trashing"; that it may
well be domesticated as "hermeneutics" or some other "fancy" methodological approach; and that it is likely to endure for some time. I think that the
second mode cannot be domesticated and may therefore be at once the least
vulnerable and the least potentially influential strand of contemporary critical theory. Finally, I think that the question of whether the two modes can
be separated is fundamental to an assessment of the future influence of CLS.
The remainder of this Article elaborates on these thoughts.
The first mode raises a series of scholarly inquiries that need not be undertaken with the purpose of demonstrating that mainstream scholarship is a
self-contradictory enterprise. The idea that ideology takes several forms,
from the more explicit forms of policy and principles to the less explicit
forms of boundary theory and paradigmatic research designs, is a liberating
one. It helps us understand not only why balancing in the first amendment
can be seen as contingent or flawed, but why cultural conditions and academic structures define certain questions as relevant and others as marginal
or beyond dispute at certain times. Above all, it exposes all scholarship,
policymaking, or rule declaration as imprisoned by time and place and thus
incapable of being universalized. It prevents any discipline from a claim of
either being value free or of searching for truth. It makes history, linguistic
analysis, and philosophy more than mere esoterica, and it strips the hardness
from the hard and even the harder sciences. It has the potential to transform scholarly inquiry and even conceptions of what knowledge and education are.
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But one need not believe in political revolution to endorse the perhaps
revolutionary intellectual contribution described above. That is the problem
advocates of critical theory face in summoning up the Realists as their progenitor. Critical theorists are not merely carrying out the Realists' unfinished programs. They have gone well beyond Realism, but in ways that do
not necessarily require the political radicalism they espouse. Just as we were
once "all Realists," in the domesticated sense, we may at some point become
"all crits." Then, by definition, radicalism and transformative politics of the
kind envisaged by critical theorists will not be possible.
But any total domestication of the Critical Legal Studies movement seems
to rest on an assumption that the political messages of the movement are
capable of being separated from the methodological messages. My experience up to this point, and my intuitions about the future, incline me to suggest that such a separation is not easy and may not be possible. A movement
whose first premise is that law is inseparable from politics is hardly likely to
cooperate in any such separation, and the politicization of one segment of a
law school may have a ripple effect. Efforts on the part of faculty or students
to agree with CLS theory but disagree with CLS politics may come to appear, both to those making such efforts and to others, as schizoid. By asking
other faculty and students to take stands on issues, critical theorists may be
contributing to the emergence of an attitude among most persons engaged in
academic law that scholarship (or teaching) is politics, and politics is
scholarship.
If one assumes that separation of the two modes of critical theory is difficult at best, critical theory can be seen as a profoundly destabilizing force in
American legal education and, eventually, in American legal culture. In a
number of respects critical theory undermines the basic argument implicitly
made by law professors to justify their stature: that they "know the law." If
law is inseparable from politics and knowledge contingent and culturally determined, "knowing the law" becomes close to synonymous with having the
current political power. Even if one does not want to transform legal education by throwing out all the reactionary guardians of the hierarchy and replacing them with persons with the proper political consciousness and
experience, 94 one may have to concede that political transformations have
become possible when the basic grounds justifying deference to statured persons in a profession have been shaken. In a universe populated by students
as well as faculty, with a certain degree of intragenerational conflict, attacks
on the legitimacy of the elders are necessarily destabilizing.
If the threat of destabilization is taken seriously, a backlash against critical theory may occur. The paradox of the backlash may be that the same
tactics employed by opponents of Critical Legal Studies-politicization of
scholarship and teaching, agendas and strategies in appointments and other
internal matters, and attribution of "lunatic fringe" views to one's political
enemies-are those allegedly employed by the critical theorists themselves.
94. Cf. D.

(1983).
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If this scenario comes to pass, the "crits" will in a sense have won even if
they lose individual battles: they will have transformed the discourse of legal
academic life. Furthermore, if a generation of law students experiences that
transformed discourse, it requires little imagination to anticipate their entering the profession with a view that law is indeed inseparable from politics.
The nightmarish vision embedded in this scenario, to those in legal academics who deeply believe that law is above or beyond or outside politics,
may precipitate efforts to domesticate the critical theory movement. Such
efforts have already surfaced. One such effort might be represented in the
claim that critical theory provides "an interesting angle on my work"; another by efforts to merge the more "civil" or "acceptable" critical theorists
into traditionalist academic power roles, such as chairs of significant committees; another by the simple act of purging the less acceptable members of
CLS by tenure denials so that others will "get the message." All these domestication strategies may result in the harnessing of critical theory in ways
comparable to the harnessing of the Realists.
But so long as the dramatic dissolution of the fact-value dichotomy, first
perpetrated in legal scholarship by the CLS movement, takes hold, I venture
to suggest that twentieth-century American legal theory will not likely be
the same again. The tacit alliance between empiricism and neutrality will be
shattered; the contradiction between value orientation and objective research
will be exposed. With the breakup of the fact-value dichotomy, ideology
may come to be seen as the dominant force in academic life, and claims to
neutrality in scholarship or teaching put decisively on the defensive. If that
scenario comes to pass, the 1970s may one day appear to be as important an
intellectual watershed for American law and legal thought as Langdell's
1870s.

